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A glimpse into the future of services liberalization
The world is abuzz with news of the leaked draft 
text of the financial services annex of the Trade in 
Services Agreement (TISA). Up until recently, no 
results of the negotiations had been made public, 
so naturally, critics of the agreement are taking this 
opportunity to discuss the perceived shortcomings 
of draft text. Here I address the concerns that arise 
specifically in the context of the establishment of 
foreign companies on host country soil or foreign 
direct investment (FDI). 
Traditionally covered as both Mode 3 (commercial 
presence) in the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), and as individual investment 
measures in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS), FDI coverage within 
trade agreements has garnered a substantial amount 
of criticism over the years (e.g., ActionAid 2008, 
Muchlinski and Gomez-Palacio 2008). Outside of 
the WTO, investment treaties have increasingly 
constrained government regulation of foreign 
investments and investors and allowed investor 
protection to encroach on state sovereignty through 
investor-state dispute resolution clauses (Thrasher 
and Gallagher 2010). These agreements commonly 
target provisions that countries have historically 
relied on to build up industry, protect trade and 
current account balances and support native 
cultures and people groups.
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“Fully opening the Chinese financial 
system will require keen attention to 
prioritizing other important reforms and 
to designing a strong and flexible set of 
cross-border financial regulations.”
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News of the leaked draft text of the financial services annex of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) has enlivened 
critics and given them opportunity to discuss the substantive shortcomings of the agreement. This brief addresses how 
the leaked text could impact host state regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI). The TISA negotiations are attempting 
to make progress in services liberalization outside of the stalled WTO proceedings. Proponents recognize potential 
importance of such an agreement in today’s services-driven economy. However, services liberalization has not resulted in 
the same consistent growth as liberalizing goods trade did in the mid-20th century. 
Here I discuss four key provisions in the leaked draft text that threaten to destabilize the global economy by exceeding 
the scope and coverage of the existing services liberalization as applied to FDI. First, by extending the “right of 
establishment” to foreign financial service providers, they would be granted almost automatic entry into any host 
state that is a party to the agreement. Second, by establishing automatic c verage of any “new financial service, host 
states may not protect themselves from new, untested financial services in the future. Third, by prohibiting even non-
discriminatory measures, foreign financial services providers receive special protection from any regulatory measures 
that may affect them, even if they affect national providers similarly. Finally, under the guise of “transparency”, this new 
draft text gives foreign providers political power in the host state to shape future financial services regulation.
Unpacking that provision, it does allow host 
countries to enforce terms and conditions for 
authorizing those foreign financial service providers. 
However, ultimately, the right to establish, on 
equal footing with host state nationals, is upheld. 
Rights of establishment are key because, rather 
than permitting countries to limit which types and 
quantities of service providers they admit, they owe 
a legal duty to private foreign companies before they 
even arrive. Indeed, as discussed below under the 
non-discriminatory measures article (X.15), foreign 
financial service suppliers may have even greater 
rights of establishment than nationals under this 
agreement.
Automatic National Treatment on “New Financial 
Services”
“Each Party shall permit financial service 
suppliers of any other Party established in 
its territory to offer in its territory any new financial 
service” (X.10). 
Additional proposals suggest that the article would 
be limited by a commitment to national treatment 
(“any new financial service that a party would permit 
its own like financial service suppliers to supply 
. . .” (US/Panama proposal)). It also would grant 
to the host state the freedom to “determine the 
institutional and juridical form” of the new financial 
service supplier.
Despite these caveats, this provision creates a great 
deal of uncertainty for countries signing on to this 
agreement. Given the previously discussed “right 
of establishment” host states must already allow 
foreign entities onto their soil, but here, they must 
also blindly bind future policy makers to allow any 
P A G E  2               A  G L O B A L  E C O N O M I C  G O v E R N A N C E  I N I T I A T I v E  P O L I C Y  B R I E F               J U L Y  2 0 1 4
“Countries that have 
liberalized both FDI 
and foreign portfolio 
investment have been 
more likely to encounter 
financial crises than 
economic growth”
The TISA negotiations are an attempt to move 
services liberalization forward outside of the 
WTO, where negotiations have been at a virtual 
standstill since the beginning of the Doha Round 
in 2001. Proponents of the agreement are quick to 
recognize the potential importance of this effort. The 
negotiations currently involve 50 state participants 
that account for 70 percent of the world’s trade 
in services (Coalition of Services Industries 2014). 
Samuel A. Di Piazza, Chairman of the Institutional 
Clients Group at Citi, points out that in today’s 
economy, “[s]ervices are the enabler for all economic 
activity” (Coalition of Services Industries 2013). Di 
Piazza speaks out strongly in favor of a market-
based, rather than government-based, global 
economy, pointing out that these market principles 
are “a proven formula for the creation of wealth and 
its most efficient means of distribution” (Coalition of 
Services Industries 2013). 
Except that it is not that simple. In fact, while 
liberalization in goods trade has brought about 
much of the promised growth since the advent of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
same cannot be said of services and investment 
liberalization. Countries that have liberalized both 
FDI and foreign portfolio investment have been 
more likely to encounter financial crises than 
economic growth (Thrasher and Gallagher 2014). 
There are four key ways in which the leaked TISA 
text promises to threaten stable economic growth 
by exceeding the scope and coverage of the existing 
global liberalization of FDI in financial services: 
right of establishment, automatic “new financial 
service” coverage, prohibition on non-discriminatory 
measures, and transparency requirements.
Rights of Establishment
“Each Party shall grant financial service 
suppliers of any other Party the right to 
establish or expand within its territory, including 
through the acquisition of existing enterprises . . . 
a commercial presence” (X.7).
Subject, of course, to conditions and limitations 
in the parties’ schedules, the European Union and 
United States propose that each party must allow 
foreign financial companies onto their soil and allow 
them to acquire and expand their companies with 
minimal restriction. Panama proposes furthermore 
that host countries may not impose numerical 
restrictions on the number of foreign financial 
establishments.
newly available financial services, regardless of 
policy implications. Professor Jane Kelsey, Faculty of 
Law at the University of Auckland, points out that 
the 2008 Financial Crisis was due in part to novel 
financial products such as Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) (“naked” insurance that amounted to “bets 
on whether insured assets owned by someone 
else would fail) (Kelsey 2014). In light of the role 
of CDS’s and other financial products in the Crisis, 
anticipatorily binding policies that would regulate 
or prohibit future inventions of that kind, could 
increase global economic instability.
Non-Discriminatory Measures
“Each Party shall endeavor to remove or 
to limit any significant adverse effects on 
financial service suppliers of any other Party 
of . . . measures that, although respecting the 
provisions of the Agreement, affect adversely the 
ability of financial service suppliers of any other 
Party to operate, complete or enter the Party’s 
market” (X.5, emphasis added). 
This is a startling provision that seems to prohibit 
certain measures, even though they are also applied 
to national services suppliers and therefore, not 
in violation of national treatment. In practice, this 
grants foreign financial service suppliers greater 
rights than national suppliers, allowing them to 
petition their government to bring a complaint 
against the host state for measures that adversely 
affect them in any way. When viewed in light 
of the aforementioned right of establishment, 
this provision could give multinational financial 
corporations the power to influence behind-the-
border regulation in all TISA countries even where 
they do not yet have a commercial presence. 
Additionally, when combined with the following 
provision protecting transparency, these articles 
provide unprecedented rights for companies 
operating on foreign soil.
Transparency
“Each Party shall, to the extent practicable, 
provide in advance to all interested persons 
any measure of general application that the 
Party proposes . . . to allow opportunity for such 
persons to comment on the measure” (X.16 
[EU]). “At the time it adopts a final regulation, a 
Party should, to the extent practicable, address 
in writing substantive comments received from 
[such] interested persons” (X.16 [US]). 
These two proposals reach far beyond the traditional 
transparency requirements of making regulations 
and rulings available to affected people. The EU 
proposal provides foreign financial service suppliers 
the right to comment, along with national interested 
parties, on regulatory measures proposed by the 
host government. The US proposal goes further 
to demand that final regulations address the 
substantive comments received from those service 
suppliers. If combined, these provisions could give 
foreign financial service suppliers even more power 
than nationals in quasi-legislative matters of the host 
state. Allowing foreign investors such direct access 
a host state’s domestic regulation, would greatly 
increase the political power of these foreign financial 
service suppliers worldwide.
Trends
The trend is clear. As TISA marches forward 
foreign financial service suppliers (and 
perhaps other service suppliers) gain increasing 
power and influence in matter of domestic concern. 
They are granted access to the host state, future 
rights to provide any newly invented financial 
service, special protection from measures that affect 
them adversely, even if they affect national suppliers 
equally, and a voice in shaping future financial 
services regulation. If the TISA draft text enters into 
effect for the 50 negotiating members, most of 
the global trade in services will be subject to these 
provisions and more pressure will be placed on non-
members to conform to these liberalizing standards. 
Public criticism has been helpful in highlighting the 
troubling aspects of this agreement, but concerned 
citizens in affected countries must do more to keep 
this agreement, as it stands, from establishing a new 
standard in financial services liberalization.
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“ This grants foreign financial service 
suppliers greater rights than national 
suppliers, allowing them to petition their 
government to bring a complaint against 
the host state for measures that adversely 
affect them in any way. ”
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